Norway is the first, and so far the only, country to mandate a minimum fraction of female and male directors on corporate boards. We find that after a new gender balance law surprisingly stipulated that the firm must be liquidated unless at least 40% of its directors are of each gender, half the firms exit to an organizational form not exposed to the law. This response suggests that forced gender balance is costly. The costs are also firm-specific, because exit is more common when the firm is non-listed, successful, small, young, has powerful owners, no dominating family owner, and few female directors. These characteristics reflect high costs of involuntary board restructuring and low costs of abandoning the exposed organizational form.
Introduction
The choice of organizational form determines regulatory constraints on firms' governance systems, such as stockholders' ability to design the board, to separate cash flow rights from voting rights, and to choose the principles for financial reporting. Therefore, a regulatory shift may change the optimal way to organize the firm (Hansmann 1996, p. 151) . This paper analyzes how a large and unexpected shift in corporate law, with a liquidation penalty for non-compliers, influences the firm's choice of organizational form. In particular, we are the first to study how a new law for mandatory gender balance in the boardroom induces firms to exit from or not enter into the organizational form that suddenly becomes exposed to the stricter regulation.
We find that half the initially exposed firms choose to exit, and that exit propensity is driven by firm characteristics. This result suggests that the regulation is costly for firms in general, more costly for some firms than for others, and also that non-exiting firms may end up with suboptimal boards because the benefit of keeping their exposed organizational form exceeds the cost of forced gender balance. Correspondingly, our findings for the entry decision indicate that firms choosing not to enter may keep their optimal board composition, but fail to obtain their best organizational form. Thus, the observed changes in exit and entry propensities do not reflect the full corporate cost of mandatory gender balance.
The Norwegian Parliament passed a regulation in 2003 requiring that at least 40% of the firm's directors be of each gender. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) argue that this gender balance law (GBL) represents a massive, surprising shock to the stockholders' ability to design their firm's board optimally. The authors also notice that the GBL represents a natural experiment that allows the researcher to study the choice of corporate governance mechanisms with less worry than usual about endogeneity problems (Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach 2010) . Ahern and Dittmar document the magnitude of the shock by observing that the average proportion of female directors in listed firms was about 10% when the GBL was passed. During the next five years until the end of the transition period in 2008, firms complying with the 40% quota replaced about one third of their male directors by females. The number of female directorships increased by 260% (from 165 to 592 seats), while the number of male directorships dropped by 38% (from 1,516 to 938 seats). 3 Our paper identifies characteristics that separate firms that chose to comply with the GBL by making this large board restructuring, from the firms that avoided it by exiting their current organizational form. The firms exposed to the GBL have the ASA organizational form (allmennaksjeselskap), while the unexposed firms have the AS form (aksjeselskap). We also consider the flip side of the exit decision by analyzing how the GBL's passage influenced the tendency of unexposed firms to enter the exposed form, i.e., transform from AS to ASA.
Existing research has focused on firms that choose to remain ASA and hence comply with the GBL. The findings suggest that the large, forced upwards shift in the demand for female directors by ASA firms made it difficult to design post-GBL boards with pre-GBL qualities.
For instance, 69% of the retained male directors had CEO experience, compared to 31% of the entering females. The new female directors had less board experience and were on average eight years younger than their male co-directors (Ahern and Dittmar 2012) . Thus, most female directors in post-GBL ASAs differ from their male colleagues in terms of less experience and younger age.
This difference means that although the GBL regulates only gender balance per se, the law may effectively restrict stockholders' ability to choose a board with desired qualities. The reason is that such director qualities may correlate with gender. In particular, the two pools of potential male and female directors differ considerably along dimensions that may matter for the board's ability to create firm value, such as leadership experience. 1 This impression of restricted board competence in ASAs after the GBL is supported by Ahern and Dittmar. They estimate an average announcement return of -3.5% for listed firms with no female directors when the Minister of Trade and Industry announced his plans to mandate gender balance. Firms with no female directors represented about three quarters of all listed firms at that time. This result is consistent with findings from 1989 to 2002, which is before the GBL was announced. The evidence suggests that the firms would most likely have lost value if they had voluntarily improved their boards' gender balance (Bøhren and Strøm 2010) .
The subsequent value drop when the regulatory intent was announced suggests that stockholders did indeed expect a prospective GBL to be likely and costly. Also, this value drop does not appear to be a temporary overreaction. Firms that had to change their boards the 4 most typically experienced a 15% abnormal drop in their market-to-book ratio during the five subsequent years.
The cost of gender balance may differ across firms. First, the compliance costs may vary among ASAs that choose to keep their organizational form. For instance, the reported announcement returns support the notion that boards with more female directors pre-GBL must sacrifice less board competence to reach the 40% quota post-GBL. Second, firms converting from ASA to AS may experience different exit costs depending on the firm's listing status. This is because the GBL applies to any ASA regardless of whether it is listed or non-listed. However, only listed firms are required to be an ASA. Therefore, exit to avoid the quota automatically triggers delisting for a listed ASA, but not for a non-listed ASA. Third, because the GBL changes the benefit of being an ASA, the law may also influence whether the AS chooses to become an ASA.
To improve the understanding of how this one-size-fits-all regulation of gender balance has heterogeneous effects across firms, we study how the GBL affects the choice of organizational form of all exposed (ASA) and unexposed (AS) firms during nine years. This approach provides new insight for four reasons. First, following the firms' behavior during an extended time period turns out to be important. For instance, we find that among the ASAs that existed when the GBL was passed in 2003 and that did not subsequently merge or go bankrupt, 51% had chosen to exit into AS by the time the law became binding five years later.
Second, including non-listed firms is essential not just for a priori reasons, but also because the exit propensity turns out to be much higher for non-listed firms than for listed firms.
Third, we find that the tendency to enter the ASA form is not just a mere mirror image of the tendency to exit it. Thus, studying both exit and entry deepens the insight into regulatory effects. Finally, the two existing studies on valuation effects of the GBL report conflicting results. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) find negative valuation effects, while Nygaard (2011) finds positive effects using a different event date and a different sample. We avoid such ambiguity by analyzing how firms respond to the regulatory shift by changing organizational form. This direct evidence on firm behavior may improve the understanding of what forced gender balance does to different firms and why announcement returns vary across firms. The key is to identify how certain characteristics enable the firm to influence the cost of the regulatory shock by either keeping or changing its organizational form. listed ASAs decreases by 49%, while the number of listed ASAs increases by 11%. Moreover, unlike before the GBL, and unlike in neighboring countries without gender balance regulation, exit is much more common than entry.
Thus, listed firms, which cannot remain listed unless they keep the ASA form, are exiting much less often than non-listed ASAs. This finding supports the argument that the GBL less often induces a change of organizational form when the listing benefits are high. Hence, a study of exits in listed firms only would miss most of the interesting cases. Moreover, because the change in the number of ASAs is the net of exits and entries, both exit and entry should be addressed.
Regardless of listing status, we find that most exiting firms perform well and have powerful owners. This finding supports the idea that, independently of the GBL, profitable firms with low agency costs benefit the least from the strictest regulatory standards for transparency and governance, which happens under the ASA form. Exit is also more common among nonfamily firms. This result may indicate that family owners are better able than others to radically change the board's gender balance. Moreover, most firms that exit have few female directors, suggesting that regulatory costs are higher the more the board must be restructured.
Also, most firms that exit are small or young. This finding may reflect that the compliance cost is fixed relative to firm size, and that the cost of changing organizational form grows as the firm matures.
The economic significance of these results is considerably lower for firm size, firm age, performance, and ownership concentration than for family control, listing status, and the fraction of female directors. For instance, the odds of exit increase by 2.5% if the return on assets increases by one percentage point, while the odds decrease by 69% if the firm is listed rather than non-listed.
Most of these relationships are supported by the evidence for firms converting from AS to ASA. The exception is that unlike for the exiting firms, the fraction of female directors in the entering firms is not a significant predictor of conversion. This result may be driven by the fact that whereas the ASA must either meet the mandatory gender quota or exit, the AS faces 6 no such pressure. The AS enters only if it expects the benefits will exceed the compliance costs. Radically changing the gender mix is apparently not an important driver of compliance costs for firms that voluntarily choose to enter. A possible reason is that they have had sufficient time to ensure easy access to the pool of qualified female directors.
Our results are robust to alternative econometric techniques, to the definition of family control, and to how we measure performance. However, the findings do not imply that the GBL is more costly for firms that exit than for those that stay. The reason is that the non-exiting firms may find the cost of changing organizational form to be even higher than the cost of complying with the GBL. Thus, abandoning the more strongly regulated ASA form may be more burdensome than being forced to radically change board composition. This happens particularly often to the listed firms in our sample, where exit implies losing the listing benefit.
Correspondingly, AS firms that choose not to enter the ASA form may still incur a GBLrelated cost. This happens because AS firms will not enter whenever the cost of complying with the GBL exceeds the ASA benefits that are independent of the GBL, such as easier access to financing and stronger legal protection of minority stockholder rights. This paper is related to the empirical literature on the economics of corporate governance regulation. Bushee and Leuz (2004) study the effect of stricter SEC disclosure requirements for firms trading on the OTC Bulletin Board. They find that almost 75% of the firms either go private or exit to the pink sheets market, which is not exposed to the new regulation. The exit propensity is strongest for small, profitable firms with low leverage. Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2004) analyze corresponding effects of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, finding a slightly increased tendency to go private. Small firms with high ownership concentration go private more often than others. A study of 17 European countries shows that firms go private more often when corporate governance codes are introduced and when minority protection is increased. Exit is more common among small and profitable firms (Thomsen and Vinten 2007) . Overall, the findings in these papers are consistent with ours. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) briefly address exits after the GBL in their valuation study, but consider only listed firms. Because ownership characteristics are not included, the authors ignore agency costs as a determinant of exit. This bias also applies to the valuation study of Nygaard (2011) , who makes a robustness test of whether the firm's listing status influences the relationship between exit and the fraction of female directors. Moreover, both approaches 7 are biased towards finding excessive exit because they include financial firms. Financial firms were allowed to convert from ASA to AS one year before the gender quota became mandatory. Finally, these authors do not address the entry decision.
Norway is so far the only country with gender quotas in non-state firms. Hence, our findings from the first country to adopt a radically new regulation on board diversity may contribute to a more informed choice in countries that currently consider similar political measures. In particular, we can document effects from a regulatory regime that is mandatory rather than voluntary, dictates the same gender balance in all boards rather than allows for firm-specific discretion, ensures full compliance by a liquidation penalty, and applies to listed firms as well as to some non-listed firms rather than to all firms or just to listed firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the institutional setting, section 3 specifies our predictions, and section 4 presents the data and summary statistics. We explain the methodology and test the predictions in section 5, while we summarize and conclude in section 6.
Institutional setting
The first official initiatives to regulate gender balance in Norwegian corporate boards were The GBL states that the firm will be liquidated three months after non-compliance, although the government may abstain from liquidation if the firm is considered particularly important for society. However, no firm has been liquidated for non-compliance so far. A likely reason is that the alternative to fill the quota is not to liquidate, but to exit into the unexposed form. 3 This dual system is dominant worldwide, although exceptions exist in Canada, the United States, and a few other countries (Lutter 1992 Table 1 shows how the firms in our sample can respond to the GBL by changing or not changing their current organizational form. Table 1 The GBL applies to the ASA firms, only. Hence, an ASA may respond to the GBL by keeping its current organizational form. If it does, the 40% gender quota must be filled. 4 This choice response corresponds to the first row of table 1 (Stay). Alternatively, the ASA may convert into an AS (Exit), which is the response shown in the second row. Unlike for Stay, the Exit option allows the firm to continue having a board with the preferred gender mix.
The AS firms in rows 3 and 4 are not exposed to the GBL. If the AS chooses to become an ASA (Enter), it must fill the gender quota. Alternatively, the firm remains an AS (Do not enter) and chooses whatever gender balance the owners prefer.
As shown by Appendix 1, the financial reporting and the corporate governance mechanisms are less tightly regulated for AS than for ASA. For instance, an ASA must have ten times larger minimum share capital, produce financial reports containing greater detail, and provide compensation data containing greater specificity about its officers and directors. Unlike for most AS firms, CEO-chair duality is illegal in ASAs, and not more than half their share capital can be non-voting.
Appendix 1 also shows that there is less discretion in the design of corporate governance mechanisms when the ASA is listed. For instance, only listed ASAs are subject to comply-orexplain governance codes, flagging requirements, and tender offer rules. 42% of the ASAs in our sample are non-listed by year-end in 2009. 3 The dual system was introduced in 1996 to align Norwegian corporate law with legislation in the European Union. 4 The 40% quota applies only to boards with more than nine members. For smaller boards the quota is specified as a minimum number of directors per gender. There must be at least one director of each gender if the board has two or three members, at least two of each if there are four or five members, at least three of each if there are six to eight members, and at least four of each gender if the board has nine members. These thresholds imply that the quota may vary between 33% and 50% in the cross-section of compliers. Some of these countries consider whether to use mandatory law like in Norway or the softer comply-or-explain system, which is the common standard in national corporate governance codes among more than 100 countries worldwide (www.ecgi.org). Appendix 2 shows the details.
Predictions
The firm should transform itself from the ASA (exposed) to the AS (unexposed) organizational form when the firm benefits from doing so. This benefit, B(Exit), has three components:
(1) B (Exit) = Compliance costs -Compliance benefits -Benefits regardless of the GBL
Exit is optimal if B(Exit) is positive. If negative, the best choice is to continue being an ASA in compliance with the GBL. Section 5 deals with the entry decision, where the benefit of entry is the negative of (1). Either way, changing organizational form requires a two-thirds majority vote at the stockholder meeting.
If there are no market imperfections such as irrational owners or conflicts of interest between owners and managers, the compliance benefits in the second term of (1) are zero. The only effect of the GBL in such a case is to add a new constraint to the owners' value maximization problem by ruling out in an ASA any board design involving fewer than 40% of the positions 10 going to each gender. This added restriction will at best leave the owners' opportunity set unchanged.
Consequently, the GBL must be rationalized economically by its ability to reduce negative effects on stockholder wealth of market imperfections. In the absence of such benefits, the new regulation produces only compliance costs for owners as reflected in the first term of (1).
Consistent with this view, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) argue that lack of leadership experience among female directors may be a major driver of compliance costs and the resulting loss of firm value.
The third term in (1) explains why an ASA with low compliance benefits and high compliance costs may still decide not to exit. This happens when the net compliance cost of the GBL (the first two terms) is smaller than the benefit of being an ASA for reasons unrelated to the GBL (the third term). These latter reasons are independent of board composition and were also valid before the GBL. Examples are the benefit of having a liquid stock if the ASA is listed and of having the option to go public without first changing organizational form if the ASA is non-listed. Regardless of listing status, any ASA may also benefit from regulation ensuring more transparency and stronger protection of minority stockholders.
The composite nature of the exit benefit in (1) has two immediate implications. First, cost measures based on the exiting firms alone will underestimate the full cost of the GBL. This happens because regulatory costs based on just exiting firms ignore the costs for firms that stay. The latter costs are particularly relevant for the listed firms in our sample, because they cannot exit without simultaneously delisting. Second, firms more likely to exit are not just those with high compliance costs and low compliance benefits. Exit to AS is also optimal for firms with low benefits from being an ASA in the first place. For such firms, the third component in (1) is too small to overcome even a moderate cost of the GBL.
We next hypothesize how firm characteristics will influence the three components of B (Exit) in (1) and hence the likelihood of switching from the ASA to the AS organizational form after the GBL. 
Compliance costs
The costs of complying with the GBL consist of search costs for new directors, increased compensation costs for these directors once hired, and reduced private benefits for owners, who may lose control because the board is restructured.
If the owners have chosen the optimal board composition before the GBL, forced board changes, and hence the compliance costs, will be higher the fewer women the board has. This logic is supported by Ahern and Dittmar (2012) , who find that on average, only firms with no female directors lose market value at the GBL announcement. We predict that the lower the fraction of female directors, the higher the propensity to exit (H1).
If earlier top management experience matters for director quality, the finding by Ahern and Dittmar (2012) that women have less such experience than men does imply that new qualified directors must be drawn from a smaller pool than earlier. Thus, the GBL will increase both search costs and compensation costs. Because these increased costs seem rather independent of firm size, however, compliance costs will more often produce a positive exit benefit when the firm is small. We expect that the smaller the firm, the higher the propensity to exit (H2).
Family firms often have members of the controlling family in board and CEO positions (Anderson and Reeb 2003) . To illustrate, family-controlled firms in our sample have a median ownership concentration of 50%, a family chairperson in 38% of these cases, and a family CEO in 30%. In contrast, non-family firms have a median ownership concentration of 26%, and the largest owner is chairperson or CEO in 17% of the cases. The GBL may therefore threaten the family's ability to extract private benefits in the ASA whenever the gender mix among the family's director candidates does not match the mandated gender quota. Such concerns for family-internal recruiting to the board suggest that ASAs controlled by families convert more often to the AS form than other firms after the GBL.
Nevertheless, this concern for family-internal recruiting may not tell the full story about the family firm's compliance costs. The high ownership concentration and the family's governance involvement during extended periods suggest that family firms often have particularly powerful and committed owners. The long and deep experience with the firm and its environment may have enabled the family to establish a rich network with resourceful individuals outside the firm. Therefore, the controlling owner may know the outside pool of potential female directors particularly well. This argument suggests that unlike the family's 12 ability to recruit female directors from inside the family, it may be relatively easy to fill the gender quota by recruiting from outside the family. Hence, compared to other firms, familycontrolled firms may exit the exposed organizational form less often rather than more often.
We define a family-controlled firm as one where ultimate owners by blood or marriage hold more than half the equity. The two conflicting arguments imply that the expected relationship between family control and exit propensity is unspecified (H3).
Compliance benefits
The hypotheses discussed so far assume that owners always know their best interest, including the ability to establish an optimally designed board before the GBL. Allowing for imperfections in terms of gradual learning, however, firms may need time to locate the pool of director candidates and pick the best team. Such a limited ability to choose the optimal board may be particularly relevant for gender mix, because boards and recruiting committees were strongly dominated by men before the GBL (Rosener 2011) . Hence, older firms with a long learning history pre-GBL may have been closer to their value-maximizing gender balance than were younger firms with a shorter history.
This logic suggests that older firms will be hurt by a rule mandating the same gender mix for every firm, while younger firms may benefit from being forced to establish a more genderbalanced board. On the other hand, older firms may find it harder to change organizational form because they are more complex and rigid (Boone et al. 2007 ). This argument suggests older firms are less rather than more prone to exit. Thus, the expected relationship between firm age and exit propensity is unspecified (H4).
Benefits regardless of the GBL
The ASA firms in our sample are subject to tighter reporting requirements than the AS firms are. This higher transparency of ASAs reduces the asymmetric information between old and new stockholders, between majority and minority stockholders, and also between borrowers and lenders. Thus, being organized under the most demanding organizational form may reduce the cost of raising outside finance. This option is more valuable the more financially constrained the firm (Myers and Majluf 1984) . Using leverage to proxy for financial constraints, we predict that the weaker the financial constraint, the higher the propensity to exit (H5).
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For similar reasons, profitable firms may suffer less after exit because they can more easily finance growth internally. Measuring profitability as operating returns to assets after taxes (ROA), we expect that the more profitable the firm, the higher the propensity to exit (H6).
The higher transparency of ASAs than ASs because of regulatory differences may induce less costly and more intense monitoring by financiers, analysts, and the media. The resulting lower information asymmetry in ASA firms is more valuable the higher the potential agency costs, that is, the weaker the owners' incentives and power to monitor management (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1989) . Hence, an ASA with low potential agency costs reaps fewer governance benefits from being an ASA. Moreover, these low agency costs increase the likelihood that the firm will rationally choose organizational form according to the value-maximizing exit criterion in (1). We relate agency costs to ownership concentration, which we measure as the fraction of outstanding equity held by the firm's largest ultimate owner. We hypothesize that the higher the ownership concentration, the higher the propensity to exit (H7).
Unlike a listed ASA, a non-listed ASA does not change listing status when exiting to AS.
Thus, owners of listed firms have more to lose by not having their stock traded in a liquid market (Bahrat and Dittmar 2006) . Listed firms also have a much wider stockholder base, which makes them more vulnerable to free-rider and coordination problems when concerted action would benefit all stockholders as a group (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). For instance,
Norwegian listed and non-listed ASAs of similar size have on average roughly 4,000 and 10 stockholders, respectively (Bøhren 2011) . We expect that non-listed firms will exit more often than listed firms do (H8).
Summarizing predictions H1-H8, we hypothesize that a firm with the ASA organizational form, which is exposed to the GBL, will exit more often to the unexposed AS form when the firm has low leverage, high profitability, high ownership concentration, small size, few female directors, and when the firm is non-listed. The expected effects on exit of firm age and family control are left unspecified. 
Data and descriptive statistics
To allow for approximately two non-event years at the beginning and end of the regulatory events described in section 2, our sample period is 2000-2009. The sample for the analysis of exits is based on the population of ASA firms by year-end. 6 We ignore firms that exit due to merger or bankruptcy. Financial firms are excluded because they had to choose the ASA form until a new law lifted this requirement in 2007. 7 Because merging firms and financial firms may also have left the ASA form partly because of the GBL, this sample restriction biases our tests towards accepting the null hypothesis that the GBL has no effect on the choice of organizational form. Table 2 Panel A also documents that the decline after 2001 only happens in the sub-sample of nonlisted firms. The number of non-listed firms drops by 56% from 2001 to 2009, while the number of listed firms grows by 6%. This large difference suggests that if the exit decision is partially driven by the GBL's introduction, the benefit of changing organizational form to avoid the GBL is considerably larger for non-listed firms.
6 Our data set is organized by the Centre for Corporate Governance Research (www.bi.edu/ccgr). The data on family relationships are delivered by the tax authorities (www.skatteetaten.no), while Experian (www.experian.no) has delivered the accounting data and the corporate governance data. 7 Financials are also regulated differently than other firms regarding capital structure and corporate governance. For instance, the risk-adjusted leverage of banks cannot exceed 92% according to the Basel regulation, and Norwegian banking law stipulates that no investor can own more than 10% of a bank's equity without the government's permission. 8 The population of ASA firms averages 482 firms per year. Excluding financial ASAs reduces this number to 340, dropping further to 274 when we also exclude ASAs that go bankrupt or become AS because of a merger.
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The change in the number of firms from one year to the next in panel A reflects the difference between entering firms (from AS to ASA) and exiting firms (from ASA to AS) during the year. Panel B shows the exits, entries, and net exits. As already documented by panel A, net exit (exit minus entry) is generally positive and increasing. There were altogether 217 exit firms and 146 entry firms, producing a net exit of 71 firms during the sample period. Panel C confirms that this tendency to exit is much stronger among the non-listed firms. For instance, while panel A shows that the number of firm years is rather independent of listing status, nonlisted firms account for over four times more of the exits (175 vs. 42, respectively). In all, 12.1% of the non-listed firms exit yearly on average, while only 3.3% of the listed firms do.
Panel D shows that when an AS decides to transform into ASA and hence become exposed to the GBL, the firm more often enters as non-listed (no IPO) than listed (IPO), where the latter means going public in the ASA entry year (92 firms vs. 54 firms, respectively). However, this tendency is reversed after the passage of the GBL, when it becomes much more common to go public directly. Whereas 21% of the entry firms go public directly up to 2003, 54% do so subsequently. This shift in IPO propensity by entry firms suggests that although compliance with the GBL may produce similar costs and benefits regardless of listing status, listed firms earn more benefits that are unrelated to the GBL. Therefore, firms considering to become exposed after the GBL increasingly find that entry does not pay off unless the firm quickly reaps the listing benefits as well. We focus on the exits in the following, leaving discussion of the entry decision to section 5.
The empirical variables are defined in Appendix 3. Unreported summary statistics for these variables show that non-listed firms account for 55% of our observations, the largest stockholder owns on average 43% of the equity, the average board has 5.6 members of which 17% are females, while 20% of the firms are majority controlled by a family.
A firm is classified as exiting if it transforms from ASA to AS during the sample period. An exiting firm leaves the sample the year it actually exits. The firm is called non-exiting if it never abandons the ASA form during the sample period. Table 3 shows that compared to ASA firms that stay exposed to the GBL, the ASAs that convert to AS and hence become Table 2 shows that the number of firms exposed to the GBL has been dropping every year since 2002, when the intention to regulate gender balance in corporate boards was announced.
Statistical tests
Although table 2 ignores all ASA firms that become AS because of merger, bankruptcy, or regulatory change for financials, our filtering criteria might still have failed to exclude other exogenous exit determinants that are unrelated to the GBL. To account for this possibility, we compare the exit propensity for ASA firms in Norway with the exit propensity from the similar organizational form in the neighboring countries Denmark and Sweden. These two countries do not mandate gender-balanced boards, but they have the same system of dual organizational forms as Norway has.
We use a difference-in-difference approach to test whether the tendency to change 
where y it is the number of firms in group i at time t relative to the number of group i firms in the event year. Because the number of firms varies strongly across the three countries, we use the relative rather than the absolute number of firms over time in a given country. EG i is a dummy variable which is 1 if the firm is in the event group and 0 if the firm is in the nonevent group. Similarly, PE t is 1 if t is in the post-event period and 0 if t is in the pre-event period.
The estimator of D is the OLS estimate of β 3 in (2). This coefficient reflects the effect on the number of firms if the observation is from Norway (rather than a neighboring country) in the event period (rather than in the non-event period).
The number of firms in the three countries is shown in panel A of table 4. Two major factors explain why the number of firms in Denmark is much higher than in the two other countries.
First, Norway and Sweden wrote their laws for ASA type of firms around 1995 based primarily on an EU directive. Denmark, however, wrote its ASA law twenty years earlier primarily based on its existing AS law. Second, both Danish laws are less restrictive than their Norwegian and Swedish counterparts (Gomard and Schaumburg-Müller 2011) . For these reasons, we will estimate (2) using alternatively Denmark, Sweden, and both as the non-event group. Table 4 Panel B shows the estimate of β 3 , which is negative and statistically significant in every case.
The economic significance is strong. For instance, the expected number of ASA firms in the post-event period relative to the pre-event is 42% smaller in Norway than in Denmark. This 18 result reflects that the drop in the number of firms with organizational form exposed to the GBL as observed in table 2 is a unique Norwegian phenomenon.
The findings in table 4 strengthen the impression of an inverse relationship between the introduction of the GBL and the use of ASA as organizational form. We analyze this link more closely in the following by relating the exit and entry behavior to firm characteristics as specified in section 2. We first report the findings from the base case, followed by a series of robustness tests. Finally, we present estimates of an entry model.
The base case
Our base-case model is the following: Exit it is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i leaves the exposed form (ASA) during the sample period and 0 otherwise. We estimate (3) as a logit model, using the GLM and a sample from 2000-2009. Table 5 shows the coefficient estimates in the third column. Consistent with our prediction based on the compliance cost component of B(Exit) in (1), the table documents that firms with few female directors exit more often from the exposed to the unexposed organizational form (H1). This inverse relationship suggests that the costs of complying with the GBL are higher the more the board must be restructured in general, and the more that male directors must be replaced by females in particular. The finding is also in line with Ahern and Dittmar (2012) , who report that firms with no female directors lost value when plans for a GBL were announced. Table 5 Smaller firms exit more often than other firms do. This finding supports the economies of scale argument that compliance costs are fixed relative to firm size, such as the cost of searching for new female directors and having to pay them higher compensation because of short supply (H2). Moreover, firms controlled by families exit less often than other firms do.
This result is inconsistent with the logic that the family's ability to extract private benefits is threatened by a GBL that mandates a gender-based board composition the family cannot 19 match. Rather, the finding supports the argument that family owners have better access than others to female directors who can protect the owners' interests (H3).
Turning next to potential compliance benefits, the estimates show that younger firms exit more often than older firms do. This result is inconsistent with the ignorant-owner argument, but supports the notion that mature firms find it more costly to change organizational form (H4).
The third component of B(Exit) in (1) is benefits of the exposed organizational form that are independent of the GBL. Table 5 shows that unlike what we predicted, the exit decision is not significantly related to financial constraints as measured by leverage (H5). A more profitable firm is more willing to leave the exposed form, however, possibly because it can more easily self-finance investments by high earnings and can also afford the higher financing costs as the firm becomes less transparent (H6). Exit is more common when ownership concentration is high. This is evidence that strong owners can be a substitute for the disciplining effect of a stricter regulatory regime (H7).
Finally, non-listed firms are more prone to exit. This result supports the notion that listed firms have more to lose by exiting for reasons unrelated to the GBL, such as better stock liquidity, continuous pricing of their stock, and closer following by financial analysts and the media (H8).
The odds ratios in column four of table 5 show the marginal effect of the independent variables on the odds of exit. An odds ratio close to one reflects an insignificant economic effect. The independent variable reduces the odds of exit by more the closer the odds ratio is to zero, while the odds increase more strongly the more the odds ratio exceeds one.
The table documents that the economic significance of the statistically significant variables is relatively low for firm size, firm age, performance, and ownership concentration, medium for family control, and high for listing status and female directors. For instance, increasing ROA by one percentage point increases the odds of exit by 2.5%, while they decrease by 50% if the firm is controlled by a family rather than not. The odds of exit decrease by 69% if the firm is listed rather than non-listed, while they decrease by 95% if the board has only women rather than only men. Thus, the choice of econometric technique is not driving the base-case results. Table 6 Family control may be operationalized in several ways. Table 7 shows what happens when we measure family control by other proxies than the one used in table 5, which is whether the family holds a majority ownership stake (family firm). We alternatively measure family control by the fraction of board seats held by the family (family board), by whether the CEO is recruited from the family (family CEO), by the number of family members owning stock in the firm (family size), by whether a family member heads the board (family chair), and by the family's equity in the firm (family ownership).
Robustness
The table shows that the relationship between the exit decision and all other variables than ownership concentration is insensitive to how we measure family control. As in the base case, higher ownership concentration always increases the expected exit propensity. However, the statistical significance is weaker when we use family control variables that do not directly reflect the family's ownership rights. This result suggests that formal power at the stockholder meeting is the key ownership determinant of the exit decision. Overall, table 7 reflects that the estimates of (3) are robust to how family control is measured. Table 7 Unreported tests use alternative empirical measures for financial constraints and for performance. Instead of measuring financial constraints by leverage, we use annual real sales growth during either the current, the last two, or the last three years. The estimates are equivalent to those in table 5. We find the same result if we measure annual ROA during the current year or as an average during the last three years.
We have so far used the convention that if the firm exits at time t, it is classified as an exit firm also before t. 
Entry
The entry decision is expected to be driven by almost the same firm characteristics as for the exit decision. We specify the following model: Entry is a dummy variable that is 1 for firms that enter the exposed organizational form and 0 otherwise. Based on the theoretical arguments for the exit decision in section 3 as specified in hypotheses H1-H8, we predict that entry is more likely if the firm has many female directors (β 1 > 0), large size (β 2 > 0), binding financial constraints (β 5 > 0), low performance (β 6 < 0), 10 Boards in firms with more than 200 employees have one third of their directors elected by and from the employees. We find no evidence that the exit decision depends on whether the board has employee directors. Hence, even if employee directors may be more positive to the GBL than stockholders are, stockholders do not seem so be influenced by this view when making the exit decision.
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and low ownership concentration (β 7 < 0). Like we did for exit, we leave unspecified the expected effects on entry of family control (β 3 ) and firm age (β 4 ).
Because an AS firm considering entry must necessarily be non-listed, listing status is an irrelevant determinant. However, and as suggested by table 2, we expect the GBL will increase the tendency of entering firms to become listed (make an IPO; go public) directly upon entry rather than to stay non-listed in their new ASA form. The reason is that listed firms enjoy more of the benefits of being an ASA that are independent of the GBL. Hence, the GBL makes it relatively more attractive to be listed than non-listed once the firm is already an ASA. The dummy variable IPO in (4) is 1 if the entering firm chooses to become listed in the entry year and 0 otherwise. We expect a positive relationship between the propensity to enter and the tendency to become listed upon entry (β 8 > 0).
The sample is AS firms that are entry candidates during the period 2000-2009. To qualify as an entry candidate, the AS must have at least three board members and sales not less than the lowest sales observed among the ASAs.
The estimates of the relationship in (4) are shown in table 9, which reports the results from two models. In model A, an AS that converts to ASA during the sample period is classified as entering every year until the year it enters, which is the firm's last sample year. Model B uses the alternative definition, where the firm is classified as entering only in the year it actually enters. Unlike in the exit case, where every exit candidate already is an ASA, it seems more appropriate for the entry case to use the definition in model B. This definition is more appropriate because an entry candidate is not exposed to the GBL until it voluntarily chooses to enter. Moreover, many non-entering firms that qualify for entry may not even consider entry a relevant option. Finally, firms choosing to enter know what new regulation they must comply with. Hence, model B seems to reflect the more reasonable definition of an entering firm. Table 9 The estimates are consistent with our predictions for the effect of firm size, family control, firm age, ownership concentration, and the decision to go public directly. The negative coefficient for financial constraints is inconsistent with the hypothesis, strengthening the 23 impression gathered from the exit model that financial constraints do not reliably predict changes in organizational form.
The fraction of female directors is not a significant determinant of entry in model B and is even significantly negative in model A. 11 This finding suggests that non-entering firms are not held back more than entering firms are by the GBL's requirement to replace a large portion of the male directors. This result is apparently puzzling, given our earlier finding in table 5 that the existing gender mix in the board is a strong determinant of exit. However, and as already discussed, exiting and entering firms are fundamentally different in a GBL compliance sense.
An ASA firm is already exposed to the GBL and has no choice in the sense that unless it exits to AS, it must comply with the 40% quota or accept to be liquidated. An AS, however, chooses to enter and hence comply only if it wants to. Therefore, AS firms that voluntarily decide to become ASA do so because their owners think the cost of filling the gender quota is small relative to the benefit of being an ASA. Apparently, the owners also consider this cost to be independent of the board's current gender mix.
Finally, tables 5 and 9 jointly document that family-controlled firms are more hesitant than are other firms both to exit from and to enter into the ASA form. This finding suggests that when new regulation changes the benefit of the status quo, family firms are inclined to keep their organizational form, whatever that is. One possible reason is that family-controlled firms have transaction costs of organizational change that are not well accounted for by the other independent variables in our entry and exit models.
The odds ratios for model B in the rightmost column of table 9 show that the economic significance of the statistically significant determinants is low for firm size, firm age, performance, and ownership concentration. In contrast, the effect is strong for family control, financial constraints, and IPO. For instance, the odds of entry drop by 14% as the firm gets one year older, while they drop by 82% if the firm is controlled by a family rather than not.
Overall, we have shown that the radical board restructuring mandated by the GBL has strong effects on the choice of organizational form. This evidence suggests the regulation is costly, and estimates made elsewhere may indicate the magnitude of this cost. First, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) find that listed firms with no female directors experienced an abnormal price drop of 3.5% when the intention to regulate was announced. This estimate is an upper limit for the average GBL cost to ASAs, because the estimate reflects the listed ASAs only, including the three quarters of them that must restructure their boards the most if they decide to stay. Second, Fjesme (2012) finds an average first-day IPO return of 2.7% at the Oslo Stock Exchange during 2000-2008. This evidence of IPO underpricing may represent the minimum average benefit for an ASA firm of being listed instead of non-listed. Hence, 3%
may be a rough estimate of the average cost of the GBL for owners of listed firms. The average cost for non-listed ASAs is below 3%, because they lose less value when exiting than listed firms do. Importantly, however, all these estimates are averages and do not necessarily apply to an individual firm in the sample. This limitation follows from our finding that the cost and benefit of exiting or entering the organizational form exposed to the GBL depends on a series of firm characteristics.
Summary and conclusions
The findings of this paper support the idea that firms may respond to more restrictive regulation by changing their organizational form. Such change occurs when the added cost of the new regulatory constraint makes the firm's current organizational form less attractive than the best alternative. Strikingly, we find that when a new law mandates at least 40% of men and women in Norwegian boardrooms, half the firms choose to exit into an organizational form that is not exposed to the law. This tendency to avoid costly regulation by changing organizational form varies systematically with firm characteristics. We find that exit is significantly more likely when the firm is profitable, small, young, and non-listed. Exiting firms also tend to have powerful owners, no controlling family, and few female directors.
Most of these characteristics also influence the decision to enter the exposed organizational form by firms that are not exposed to the gender balance law. Even though far fewer listed firms exit than do non-listed firms, listed firms that do not exit may nevertheless have to bear the highest cost of the new regulation.
This evidence is consistent with theoretical predictions and existing empirics on how firms respond to regulatory shocks. The results are also in line with earlier findings that board composition matters for firm value, and that compulsory gender balance in the boardroom shrinks the pool of competent directors and reduces stockholder wealth. This table shows the estimated coefficients and the estimated odds ratios for a logit regression of ownership, board, family, and general firm characteristics on the decision to exit or not exit the organizational form exposed to the gender balance law. The relationship is specified in model (3) of the main text. The predicted signs of the coefficients are shown in the second column, and the pvalues of the estimated coefficients reported in the third column are stated in parentheses underneath. The estimated odds ratio in the rightmost column has the same p-value as the coefficient estimate. The dependent variable is 1 if the firm is an exit firm and 0 otherwise. Female directors is the proportion of shareholder-elected board members who are women. Firm size is the log of sales in constant 2009 millions of NOK. Family control is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the largest family owns more than 50% of the equity and 0 otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the firm was founded. Financial constraints is total debt divided by total assets. Performance is the average real return on assets per year from year t-3 to t. Ownership concentration is the fraction of equity held by the largest stockholder. Listed is a dummy variable which is 1 if the firm is quoted on the Oslo Stock Exchange and 0 otherwise. Performance is censored at the 0.5% tail and then winzorized at the 1% and 99% tails. Financial constraints is winzorized at the 1% and 99% tails. The sample is all Norwegian ASA firms in 2000-2009 that are not financials or have not exited to the AS form because of takeover or bankruptcy during the sample period. Unlike AS firms, ASA firms must comply with the gender balance law. This table shows the estimated coefficients and odds ratios for logit regressions of ownership, family, and general firm characteristics on the decision of an AS firm to become an ASA and thereby become exposed to the gender balance law. The relationship is specified in model (4) of the main text. The predicted signs of the coefficients are shown in the second column. Model A classifies the AS firm as an entry firm every year before entry if it becomes an ASA during the sample period, while Model B assigns entry status to the AS firm only the year it actually enters. For each model, we report the coefficient estimates, the estimated logit ratios, and the p-value (in parenthesis) of the coefficient estimate's t-value. The odds ratio has the same p-value as the coefficient estimate. The dependent variable is 1 if the firm is an entry firm and 0 otherwise. Female directors is the proportion of shareholder-elected board members who are women. Firm size is the log of sales in constant 2009 millions of NOK. Family control is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the largest family owns more than 50% of the equity and 0 otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the firm was founded. Financial constraints is total debt divided by total assets. Performance is the average real return on assets per year from year t-3 to t. Ownership concentration is the fraction of equity held by the largest stockholder. IPO is a dummy variable which is 1 if the firm becomes listed in the entry year and 0 otherwise. We censor financial constraints and performance at the +/-2% tails. The sample is firms with AS organizational form that are entry candidates to the ASA organizatinal form during the period 2000-2009. To qualify as an entry candidate, the AS firm must have at least three board members and sales not smaller than the lowest sales among the ASA firms that year. 
